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Abstract
Using a stress test methodology for bank liquidity risk we estimate the aggregate
liquidity shortfall in the U.S. commercial banking system at the height of 2007-09
crisis, identifying key sources of funding vulnerabilities and the dominant composition
of liquid asset holdings against liquidity shocks. The largest liquidity shocks to the
system are estimated in the first half of the crisis, in line with Acharya and Mora
(2015). Large banks experience the largest liquidity shortfall in 2008:Q1 ($154 billion
or 14% of total assets) and small banks in 2007:Q4 ($117 billion or 11% of total assets).
The dominant funding vulnerability to the system stems from large time deposits,
while government securities largely dominate other classes of liquid assets as liquidity
backstop. The analysis draws on detailed bank-level data on balance sheet flows of
funds and applies stochastic dominance eﬃciency methods to capture liquidity risk
diversification eﬀects across assets and liabilities.
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Bank liquidity risk stems from the maturity transformation function of turning liquid, short-
term deposits into illiquid, long-term loans. That makes banks susceptible to a bank-run
problem a` la Diamond and Dybvig.1 Liquidity risk crystalizes when banks cannot fully
fund their stock of loans due to liquidity demands from foreclosures of funding lines and
involuntary asset growth originated oﬀ-balance sheet. To self-insure against liquidity shocks,
banks hold high quality liquid assets (HQLA) that may swiftly monetize to meet liquidity
demands.2 The amount of precautionary HQLA holdings required to self-insure against
liquidity shocks depends on both the intensity and diversification of cash outflows across
the balance sheet. The stronger and more correlated the outflows, the higher the amount of
HQLA needed to insure against liquidity risk and vice versa.
Liquidity risk diversification eﬀects arise from synchronized increases in deposit inflows
and cash outflows to meet credit demands in periods of market stress.3 Before the 2007-09
crisis, deposit-loan synergies was a typical phenomenon allowing banks (especially larger
banks) to perform their maturity transformation role and economize on HQLA buﬀers.4
But following the collapse in housing prices and the market for asset back commercial pa-
per (ABCP) in 2007:Q3, U.S. commercial banks experienced a crisis as liquidity providers
1This problem is exacerbated by the opaqueness of bank assets (Flannery, Kwan and Nimalendran (2004,
2010)) and asymmetric information about asset quality (Rochet and Vives (2004)).
2Following the 2007-09 crisis, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision produced a new set of rules
(Basel III) requiring, among other things, banks to hold liquidity buﬀers of easy-to-sell assets against a crisis
similar to that caused by the Lehman collapse.
3Systematic correlations across assets and liabilities also arise from standard arbitrage relationships, such
as between holding reserve balances with the central bank and the level of secured (repo), or unsecured (Fed
funds) borrowing in the interbank market. In normal times, banks tend to arbitrage diﬀerences between in-
terbank and policy rates, inducing some positive correlation between reserve balances and interbank lending.
But in a stress scenario, interbank-market frictions and concerns about the stigma of tapping non-standard
central bank liquidity (discount window) may lead banks to hoard reserves and curtail interbank lending,
inducing even negative correlations between reserve balances and interbank lending, or borrowing. This is
discussed extensively in Acharya and Merrouche (2013) and Ashcraft, McAndrews and Skeie (2011).
4See, for instance, Kashyap and Stein (2000), Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein (2002) Gatev and Strahan
(2006), Gatev, Schuermann, and Strahan (2006), Cornett, McNutt, Strahan, and Tehranian (2011), Acharya
and Mora (2015).
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(Acharya and Mora (2015)).5 This was a result of weak deposit growth driven by concerns
about bank solvency and the ability of oﬃcial safety nets to withstand the fallout of the
crisis. Following the Lehman failure in 2008Q3, liquidity pressure to U.S. commercial banks
abated due to swift reversal in aggregate flows from money market mutual funds into bank
deposits, which by then had benefited from extended government guarantees.
In this paper we develop a stress test methodology to estimate the aggregate shortfall of
high quality liquid assets (HQLA) in the U.S.-chartered commercial banking system at the
height of 2007-09 crisis. We also identify key sources of funding vulnerabilities to the system
and the dominant composition of liquid asset holdings against liquidity shocks.
Taking the standpoint of a macro-prudential regulator, we consider systematic foreclo-
sures of funding lines, combined with involuntary asset growth, as the basic source of systemic
liquidity risk. This is in the spirit of Allen, Babus and Carletti (2013), noting that funding
foreclosures may occur systematically across banks due to information spillovers. They show
that the incidence of foreclosures increases in asset commonality across banks, in the oppor-
tunity cost of funds, and in bankruptcy costs. All three conditions were met at the onset
of the crisis, nourishing a perfect storm of systematic foreclosures in the U.S. commercial
banking system. Table 1 shows a high concentration of bank assets in loans secured by real
estate, which make up more than half of the average balance sheet. Also, bankruptcy costs
increased due to housing market collapse in August 2007, at the same time that the oppor-
tunity cost of money market funding hiked following the ABCP market closure (Acharya,
Schnabl and Suarez (2013)).
[Table 1]
The analysis rests on the premise that U.S. commercial banks had entered a deleveraging
phase since the onset of 2007-09 crisis, steering clear of voluntarily increases in loan stock.
Thus any positive (negative) growth in assets (liabilities) during the crisis – in excess of any
5Similar evidence is provided by He, Khang, and Krishnamurthy (2010) and Ashcraft, Bech, and Frame
(2010).
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structured component due to seasonalities and other factors – is assumed to be involuntary
and exogenous. Conditioning on a liquidity shock to the system, liquidity risk crystallizes if
involuntary cash outflows from asset and liability demands exceed banks’ HQLA buﬀers, in
which case the stock of loans cannot be fully funded. We argue this possibility is minimized
if the distributional distance between net cash outflows and changes in shareholders’ equity
is maximized. In other words, liquidity risk is minimized if net cash outflows respect a
first-order stochastic dominance (FSD) criterion relative to changes in shareholders’ equity.
FSD is a central theme in a variety of applications in economics and finance. It aims at
comparing random variables under a common set of preferences by rational decision-makers.
Stochastic orderings are binary relations defined on classes of probability distributions. They
translate mathematically intuitive ideas like being larger or being more variable for ran-
dom quantities. Lately, multivariate comparisons have become more popular. Scaillet and
Topaloglou (2010) use stochastic dominance eﬃciency (SDE) tests to compare a given port-
folio with a best diversified portfolio of assets. In this paper we follow a similar methodology
to select a balance sheet structure (called the SDE balance sheet) that minimizes liquidity
risk, taking into account liquidity risk diversification eﬀects across the balance sheet.6 The
SDE balance sheet implies a HQLA and funding mix that, conditionally on a liquidity shock,
makes cash outflows less likely to outpace changes in shareholders’ equity, which is used as
a benchmark.
We consider a balance sheet split of 10 asset classes and 7 liability classes. Asset classes
include 4 loan classes, 5 liquid asset classes, and a residual class of other assets. In particular,
liquid asset classes include cash, Fed funds sold and repo, government securities, agency MBS,
equities, and other available-for-sale securities. Based on a fair-value loss criterion, we classify
as HQLA cash, Fed funds sold and repo, government securities, and agency MBS. Liability
6Post (2003), Kuosmanen (2004) and Scaillet and Topaloglou (2010) introduce the notion of SDE that
extends pairwise stochastic dominance analysis in a portfolio context, allowing for diversification eﬀects. The
identified SDE allocation of portfolio weights is also the best allocation according to the first-order stochastic
dominance criterion (Hadar and Russel (1969), Bawa (1975)).
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classes include Fed funds purchased and repo, 5 deposit classes, and a residual category
of other liabilities. Deposit classes include demand deposits, interest bearing transaction
deposits, small time deposits (less than $100,000), large time deposits (more than $100,000),
and a residual class of other deposits.
The proportions (weights) which asset and liability classes enter the SDE balance sheet
are selected non-parametrically, avoiding the use of a parametric risk measure or loss func-
tion. The SDE criterion rewards asset and liability classes that show low intensity of cash
outflows and tend to mitigate liquidity tensions from other parts of the balance sheet. The
higher the SDE weight the less likely the respective balance sheet class to generate involun-
tary cash outflows concurrently with other classes and vice versa. Therefore, SDE weights
provide a measure of liquidity contributions. HQLA classes are assigned a high (low) SDE
weight if monetization of assets from these classes tends to oﬀset a large (small) proportion
of liquidity demands elsewhere on the balance sheet. Similarly, deposit classes are assigned
a high (low) SDE weight if funding inflows (outflows) in these classes tend to mitigate (ex-
acerbate) cash outflows.
The aggregate liquidity shortfall in the system is the diﬀerence (if positive) between the
estimated HQLA buﬀer implied by the SDE balance sheet and actual HQLA holdings by
banks. In other words, the aggregate liquidity shortfall is the extra buﬀer of HQLA – in
addition to actual holdings by banks – needed to best insure full funding of existing stock of
loans in the system, taking into account liquidity risk diversification eﬀects across assets and
liabilities. By measure of estimated shortfall we compare liquidity shocks through time to
determine the largest liquidity shocks to the system during the crisis. Against these shocks,
we identify funding vulnerabilities of the system and dominant compositions of precautionary
liquid asset holdings.
SDE balance sheets are estimated separately for small and large banks conditionally on
aggregate liquidity shocks to the system. To derive proxies for liquidity shocks we exploit
large pieces of Call Report data for the period 2002:Q1-2009:Q1 and draw on cross-sectional
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heterogeneity of balance sheet flows across banks. Moreover, to compare liquidity shocks
over time we insulate unstructured variability in the flow of funds from structured changes
due to seasonalities and individual bank eﬀects. Thus we adjust growth rates in assets
and liabilities by taking the residuals of estimated panel regressions on quarter dummies
and individual bank fixed eﬀects, removing also possible autocorrelation. As a proxy of
the liquidity shock to the system each quarter we use the empirical joint distribution of
unstructured components of growth rates in balance sheet classes during the quarter.
Precautionary HQLA buﬀers are important for banks to perform their maturity trans-
formation role, but they involve an opportunity cost of idle capital as they typically yield
lower expected returns than less liquid assets, such as loans. We internalize such a cost in
the SDE optimization by adding a profitability constraint that requires the SDE balance
sheet to produce expected returns that are higher than or equal to expected returns across
the peer group during the sample period. Given that the basic source of profits to banks is
interest income, we use net interest margin as a measure of bank profitability. Similarly, SDE
balance sheets are constrained to meet a capital adequacy target to internalize the capital
charge associated with the choice of balance sheet structure. As a measure of bank capital
adequacy we use the Tier-1 capital ratio.
Another constraint to the SDE optimization problem is that banks cannot freely reduce
the stock of loans due to loan illiquidity. Therefore, SDE allocations of loan classes are
constrained to be greater than or equal to their initial level. That allows liquidity contri-
butions by HQLA and deposit classes to be determined jointly, taking into account possible
diversification eﬀects between involuntary loan growth and funding inflows. Moreover, oﬀ-
balance-sheet exposures may be a significant source of system vulnerability, as noted by
Papanikolaou and Wolﬀ (2014). Loan commitments, in particular, may expose banks to
significant liquidity risk in periods of market stress.7 We implicitly control for the impact
7For example, U.S. commercial banks honored loan commitments to corporates following significant draw-
downs in the second half of August 2007, as documented in Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010), Campello,
Giambona, Graham, and Harvey (2011), Berrospide, Meisenzahl, and Sullivan (2012) and Berrospide and
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of loan commitments on system liquidity risk by constraining the stock of loans from being
reduced, while at the same time the empirical joint distribution of balance sheet flows allows
loan growth to be positive, which in a stress scenario is considered as involuntary growth
and attributable to commitment drawdowns.
To put things in perspective, consider the average composition of U.S. commercial banks’
balance sheet, for the period 2007:Q3-2008:Q2. Table 1 shows that average composition
hardly changes during the period, but more action is evident at growth level. Table 2
presents linear correlations and moments of (unstructured) growth rates in assets and li-
abilities for large banks in 2008:Q1. Growth in loans secured by real estate shows high
skewness (3.83) and kurtosis (24.93), implying high liquidity demands from borrowers. At
the same time, growth in certain deposit classes is particularly weak. Time deposits (above
$100,000) and interest bearing transaction deposits show negative growth rates (-4%) and
negative skewness, implying high levels of foreclosures. In contrast, other deposits have
positive skewness (3.07) and significant correlation with loans secured by real estate (0.34).
This indicates that funding inflows in other deposits may compensate for liquidity demands
from real estate borrowers. We formalize such comparisons of liquidity contributions using a
SDE criterion, considering all possible moments of the empirical joint distribution of balance
sheet flows and full diversification eﬀects.
[Table 2]
The results show that the largest liquidity shock to the system occurred in the first half
of 2007-09 crisis. Large banks faced it in 2008:Q1, with an estimated HQLA shortfall of
$154 billion (14% of total assets). That compares with a shortfall of $88 billion (8% of
total assets) in 2007:Q4 and $46 billion (4% of total assets) in 2008:Q2. Small banks faced
the largest shock in 2007:Q4, with an estimated HQLA shortfall of $117 billion (11% of
Meisenzahl (2015).
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total assets). Government securities largely dominate all classes of liquid assets as liquidity
backstop, and funding vulnerabilities are dominated by weak growth in large time deposits
(above the FDIC deposit insurance coverage limit). But since the onset of the crisis, the U.S.
commercial banking system appears to have benefitted from government-sponsored borrow-
ing and substantial inflows in time deposits following the increase of the deposit insurance
coverage limit. This is consistent with Acharya and Mora (2015), noting that government
support was a predominant factor allowing banks to honor their role as liquidity providers
during the crisis. Robustness of results is confirmed using alternative specification of the
optimization problem, using diﬀerent sets of constraints. Bootstrapping techniques also con-
firm the robustness of results to alternative specifications of the underlying distribution of
balance sheet flows.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the basic framework
and Section 3 describes the SDE optimization procedure. Section 4 discusses the empirical
strategy and data. Section 5 presents the results and Section 6 concludes. A proof is included
in the Appendix, and tables and figures are gathered at the end.
2 Basic framework
Let bank assets At funded by debt liabilities Lt and equity Et at time t. Assets consist of
illiquid loans, HQLA and other items, while liabilities are mainly liquid short-term funds,
both retail and wholesale. Liquidity risk stems from the possibility that the bank next period
t+ 1 is unable to fully fund its assets as a result of involuntary flows in assets or liabilities.
The easier to compensate for such flows the lower the liquidity risk and vice versa.
Conditioning on time t and on a stress scenario hitting the system next period t+ 1 any
increase in assets (∆At+1)
+ or reduction in liabilities (∆Lt+1)
− is assumed to be involuntary
and exogenous.8 Involuntary outflows from asset and liability demands are the basic sources
8The idea is that amidst adverse shocks banks generally wish not to engage in asset growth or cutting
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of liquidity risk, which crystallizes if net outflows (∆At+1 −∆Lt+1) turn out to be greater
than changes in equity ∆Et+1. To minimize such possibility as of time t, next-period changes
in assets ∆At+1, liabilities ∆Lt+1 and equity ∆Et+1 must preserve the following first-order




This would be compatible with any strictly monotonic preference of the macroprudential
regulator aiming to impose relationship (1), which in terms of conditional probabilities Pt (·)
implies
Pt (∆At+1 −∆Lt+1 ≤ x) ≥ Pt (∆Et+1 ≤ x) ∀x ∈ R (2)
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down their funding lines voluntarily. Instead, they would aim to delever by reducing assets or increasing





t+1 (1− levt) ≺
FSD
gEt+1 (7)
The stochastic dominance criterion (7) compares conditional distributions of growth rates
in assets and liabilities with that of growth rates in equity that is used as benchmark. Let
wit,A be the proportion of total assets allocated in asset class i and w
j
t,L the proportion of
total liabilities allocated in liability class j. Let also git+1,A and g
j
t+1,L be the growth rates in
the respective asset and liability classes over the next period. Liquidity risk is minimized for
the balance sheet allocation that satisfies the FSD criterion (7), taking into account liquidity























Before we solve for the optimization problem, we discuss profitability, capital adequacy,
and loan illiquidity constraints that liquidity optimal allocations must also respect.
2.1 Profitability constraint
In order to select SDE weights for asset and liability classes we consider their impact on
expected profitability. Given that interest income is the main source of income for commercial
banks, as a profitability metric we use the net interest margin (nimar), defined as the ratio
of net interest income (interest income minus interest expense) to total assets. We assume
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the following mapping from asset and liability weights wit,A, w
j
t,L into net interest margin.
9














t,L + εt+1 (9)
where, Git+1,A and G
j
t+1,L are gross growth rates in the stock of asset and liability classes, β0,
βi, γj are fixed coeﬃcients, and E (εt+1) = 0.
Equation (9) implies loadings for asset (liability) classes equal to coeﬃcients βi (γj) times
the respective growth rates Git+1,A (G
j
t+1,L). These loadings capture the opportunity cost of
holding liquid assets and the relative cost of liabilities. The implied mapping of balance
sheet weights into net interest margin is assumed known to the macroprudential regulator
and can be inferred from cross-sectional heterogeneity across banks, as discussed in Section
5. Estimating (9) and assuming rational expectations about mean growth rate in assets
G
i
A and liabilities G
j
L, we get the following profitability constraint to the SDE problem for

















t,L ≥ profitability target (10)
where, β̂0, β̂i, γ̂j are estimated coeﬃcients from a cross sectional regression presented in
Section 5, and profitability target refers to mean net interest margin across banks.10
9Let turnover Yt+1 from assets Ait+1 and liabilities L
j











. Assuming perfect competition and decreasing returns to scale, the return
of each balance sheet class is equal to its marginal product and net interest income niit+1 is given by
niit+1 =
(
1−∑i βi −∑j γj)Yt+1. Dividing both sides by total assets at time t and expressing asset
and liability classes at t + 1 as stock at t times the respective gross growth rate, the first-order Taylor
approximation of nimart+1 is the deterministic counterpart of (9).
10We also experimented with alternative profitability metrics, such as the return on assets (roa), and
profitability targets, such as the upper 25th percentile of the nimar distribution. However, the results
remain broadly unchanged.
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2.2 Capital adequacy constraint
Banks also face capital constraints, both due to regulatory rules and market discipline.
Capital constraints are usually defined as minimum ratios of some measure of bank equity to
risk-weighted assets. Minimum capital ratios depend on asset composition that aﬀects risk
weighted assets in the denominator. But may also depend on the funding mix and extent
to which equity is considered suﬃcient for the bank to access certain sources of funding,
such as insured deposits. As a metric for bank capital adequacy we consider the ratio of
Tier1 capital to risk-weighted assets (tier1t+1). We assume the following mapping from asset
weights wit,A and liability weights w
j
t,L into Tier1 capital ratio.














t,L + ηt+1 (11)
where, Git+1,A and G
j
t+1,L are gross growth rates in the stock of asset and liability classes, δ0,
δi, θj are fixed coeﬃcients, and E (ηt+1) = 0.
Similar to the profitability constraint, estimating (11) and assuming rational expectations
about mean growth rate in assets G
i
A and liabilities G
j
L, we get the following capital adequacy

















t,L ≥ capital target (12)
where, δ̂0, δ̂i , θ̂j are estimated coeﬃcients from a cross sectional regression presented in
Section 5, and capital target refers to mean Tier1 capital ratio.11
11As with the profitability constraint, we experimented with alternative capital adequacy targets such as
the median and the upper 25th percentile of the cross-sectional distribution of Tier1 capital ratio. Never-
theless, the results remained qualitatively unchanged.
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2.3 Loan-illiquidity constraints
Loan illiquidity implies that banks cannot freely reduce the stock of loans, which may even
rise as a result of credit-line drawdowns by customers. Therefore, SDE weights for loan
classes are constrained to be greater than or equal to their initial level.
wit,A ≥ wit−1,A, for every loan class (13)
That allows to determine liquidity contributions by HQLA and deposit classes, while taking
into account possible diversification eﬀects between involuntary loan growth (e.g. due to
credit-line takedowns) and other balance sheet items, such as various classes of deposits.
Next we discuss the SDE optimization methodology.
3 The optimization problem
In this section we describe the stochastic dominance framework that identifies the optimal
balance sheet allocations wit,A and w
j
t,L that satisfy relationship (8).
3.1 Stochastic dominance eﬃciency
SDE oﬀers a unified framework to capture diversification eﬀects and liquidity risk contribu-
tions among various assets and liabilities. It is an extension of the typical pair-wise stochastic
dominance by allowing full diversification and is able to address questions such as which asset
and liability class contributes more, or less, to bank liquidity risk.
We consider a processXA,L,s taking values in Rn, where n is the total number of balance
sheet items that we consider. The observations are a realization of {XA,L,s, s = 1, ..., S},
where S is the number of banks in the system. That corresponds to our data of observed
growth rates in assets gAt+1 and liabilities g
L
t+1 at time t+1, adjusted for current bank leverage
levt, i.e. gAt+1levt, g
L
t+1 (levt − 1). Let F (x) be the cumulative distribution function of X.
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Let us consider an allocation of asset classes wt,A and liability classes wt,L, such that
wt,A ≥ 0, wt,L ≥ 0 and e′wt,A = e′wt,L = 1, with e being a vector of ones. This means
that all the asset and liability classes have non-negative weights that sum to one. Let also












(−w′t,A,w′t,L)′ ≤ z) dF (u) (14)
The cdf of the benchmark is given by
G(z, gt+1,E;F ) :=
∫
R
I(−gt+1,E ≤ z)dF (u) (15)
According to the FSD criterion, the optimally diversified allocation of assets and liabilities
is the one with the smallest possible cdf below that of the benchmark, that is






(−w′t,A,w′t,L)′ ≤ z) dF (u) ≤ ∫
R
I(−gt+1,E ≤ z)dF (u) (17)
Therefore, the supervisor selects asset and liability weights wit,A and w
j












(−w′t,A,w′t,L)′ ≤ z) dF (u)] (18)
subject to the constraints described above.
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3.2 SDE optimization approach
The SDE model tests whether there is a linear combination of growth rates in assets and
liabilities that dominates the growth in equity with respect to the first stochastic dominance
criterion. When the objective value in (18) is positive then there is at least one combination
of asset and liability classes that dominates the benchmark. The methodology yields all
balance sheet allocations, ranked from best to worst, that dominate the benchmark. The









s.t.M(Ls − 1) ≤ z − (−gst+1,E) ≤MLs , ∀ s (19b)
M(Qs − 1) ≤ z − e′XA,L,s






























t,L ≥ capital target (19e)
wit,A ≥ wit−1,A, for every loan class (19f)∑
i
wit,A = 1 ,
∑
j
wjt,L = 1 (19g)
wit,A ≥ 0 , wjt,L ≥ 0 , ∀ i, j (19h)
Qs ∈ {0, 1}, Ls ∈ {0, 1} , ∀ s (19i)
This is a mixed integer program that maximizes the distance between the sum over all






sQs which represent the empirical part
of
∫





(−w′t,A,w′t,L)′ ≤ z) dF (u), respectively. Ac-
cording to (19b), Ls equals 1 for each scenario s for which z ≥ −gsE, and 0 otherwise, and
M is a large constant. Similarly, (19c) ensure that Qs equals 1 for each scenario for which
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z ≥ e′XA,L,s
(−w′t,A,w′t,L)′ and 0 otherwise. (19d) and (19e) are the profitability and capital
adequacy constraints and (19f) are the loan illiquidity constraints. Equations (19g) require
the sum of all asset and liability weights to be equal to one, while inequality (19h) disallows
negative weights. Finally, (19i) defines the binary nature of variables Qs and Ls.
This is a diﬃcult problem to solve since it involves a large number of binary variables.
In order to speed up the estimation we reformulate the problem to make it tractable. For
that we need the following.
Proposition 3.1 The optimal value of z belongs to the finite set R = {r1, ..., rS}.
Proof. : See Appendix.
A direct consequence of Proposition (3.1) is that we can solve the original problem by
solving the smaller problems P (r), r ∈ R, in which z is fixed to r. Then we take the
value for z that yields the best total result. The advantage is that the optimal values of
the Lt variables are known in P (r). Precisely,
∑
s Ls is equal to the number of s such that
−gst+1,E ≤ r. Moreover, the factor
√
S/S can be left out in the objective function, since S
is fixed. Hence maximization problem (15) is transformed into the following minimization
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t,L ≥ capital target (20d)
wit,A ≥ wit−1,A, for every loan class (20e)∑
i
wit,A = 1 ,
∑
j
wjt,L = 1 (20f)
wit,A ≥ 0 , wjt,L ≥ 0 , ∀ i, j (20g)
Qs ∈ {0, 1} , ∀s (20h)
The computational time for this mixed integer programming formulation is significantly
reduced. For the optimal solution (which involves at most 198 mixed integer optimization
programs, one for each discrete value of z) it takes less than two hours. The problems
are optimized with IBM’s OSL solver on an iMac computer with a 4*2.93 GHz Power,
8Gb of RAM. We note that the solution time increases exponentially with the number of
observations.12
4 Empirical strategy
We draw on an initial dataset from the Reports of Condition and Income (Call Reports)
that covers all U.S. commercial banks for the period 2002:Q1-2009:Q1. The sample period is
constrained by confidentiality restrictions in reporting and our objective to achieve maximum
12The optimizations are modelled using the General Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS). It consists of
a language compiler and integrated high-performance solvers. GAMS is tailored for complex, large scale
modeling applications. The OSL solver uses the branch and bound technique to solve the MIP program.
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possible detail in the classification of balance sheet items.
4.1 Liquidity shocks
For each quarter of 2007-09 crisis, we derive a proxy of the liquidity shock to the system
by drawing on cross-sectional heterogeneity in stock growth of balance sheet classes across
banks. To compare liquidity shocks across quarters we insulate unstructured variability in
growth rates from structured variability due to seasonalities and individual bank eﬀects.
Therefore, growth rates in balance sheet classes are adjusted by taking the residuals of es-
timated panel regressions on quarter dummies and individual bank fixed eﬀects over the
sample period (2002:Q1-2009:Q1), including also autoregressive components AR(k) to re-
move possible autocorrelation. As a proxy of the liquidity shock to the system each quarter








βjquarterj + vi + u˜i,t (21)
where, gi,t is stock growth in a given balance sheet class of bank i in quarter t, ρk are
autoregressive coeﬃcients, quarterj are quarter dummies, vi is fixed eﬀect, and u˜i,t is the
unstructured component of stock growth.
4.2 Balance sheet structure and data
We split assets and liabilities into 17 balance sheet classes in total. This is the finest split we
could obtain given Call Report confidentiality restrictions and limited popularity of certain
13These are estimated separately for small and large banks. The number of autoregressive lags is selected
to eliminate autocorrelation in panel data, based on Wooldridge test, and to produce the most parsimonious
model on the basis of BIC criterion. To deal with endogeneity problems due to the existence of lagged
dependent variables and fixed eﬀects, we instrument lagged growth rates by their lagged diﬀerences using
standard Arellano-Bond type instruments, i.e. allowing each quarter to occupy a separate column in the
weighting matrix. The validity of overidentifying restrictions is checked using the standard Sargan-Hansen
test.
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items that often take zero values. On the asset side, we consider 4 loan categories of real estate
loans (asset class 2), commercial and industrial loans (asset class 3), loans to individuals
(asset class 4) and other loans (asset class 5). Liquid assets include cash, Fed funds sold and
reverse repo (asset class 1) and the 4 categories of available-for-sale (AFS) securities. These
are government securities (asset class 6), agency MBS (asset class 7), equities (asset class 8),
and other AFS securities (asset class 9). Other tangible assets (asset class 10) are defined as
residual category. On the liability side, we consider Fed funds purchased and repo (liability
class 1), demand deposits (liability class 2), interest bearing transaction deposits, such as
NOW, ATS, telephone and preauthorized transfer accounts (liability class 3), time deposits
less than $100,000 (liability class 4), time deposits more than $100,000 (liability class 5),
other deposits (liability class 6), and a residual category of other liabilities (liability class 7).
Given the possibility of internal capital markets operating within multi-bank holding
companies (BHC), we focus on bank holding companies instead of individual commercial
banks.14 To obtain BHC data we sum across banks with same five-digit code (id rssdHH1)
assigned to the principle holding company or the highest holding company in a tiered or-
ganization. We follow that route instead of drawing on FR Y-9C reporting forms in order
to achieve the finest possible split of asset and liability classes, while obtaining a number of
banks suﬃcient enough to accommodate data requirements of the SDE optimization proce-
dure.15 Following the aforementioned consolidation process for individual bank Call Report
data, we obtain an original sample of 146,016 quarterly BHC observations from 6,221 banks.
For every quarter, we categorize banks into two size categories, small and large, relative to
the 95th percentile of the distribution of tangible total assets. Moreover, to avoid growth
rates that are due to bank mergers and acquisitions we drop observations (2,249) for which
the number of banks within the BHC is diﬀerent from the previous quarter.
For variables that often report with zero value – such as Fed funds and repos – growth rate
14For example, Holod and Peek (2010) find evidence of the existence of internal capital markets within
multi-BHCs that allow banks to oﬀset liquidity shocks from monetary policy decisions.
15A similar data consolidation approach for deriving BHC data is used by Holod and Peek (2010).
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is defined as zero if both the current and lagged level is zero, otherwise reported missing.
As a result of calculating growth rates, introducing lags in (21) to obtain unstructured
components, and dropping observations with missing values in unstructured growth rates for
any of the 17 balance sheet classes, we obtain a final sample of 5,328 quarterly observations
(2,973 observations for small banks and 2,355 for large bank) from 483 banks (277 small
banks and 206 large banks).
The whole sample for the period 2002:Q1-2009:Q1 is utilized for purposes of estimating
the unstructured component of stock growth in assets and liabilities in (21) and reduced-form
econometric models for the profitability and capital adequacy constraints (19d) and (19e).
For SDE optimization, we use the empirical joint distribution of unstructured growth rates
each quarter of the period 2007:Q1-2009:Q1. For that period, the maximum number of large
(small) banks is 75 (122) and appears in 2009:Q1 (2008:Q3), and the minimum number is
61 (100) and appears in 2008:Q2 (2007:Q1). Next we discuss further adjustments and data
limitations.
4.3 Flow of funds and stock adjustments
Before taking growth rates in loans we adjust the stock of each loan category adding back
the corresponding quarterly charge-oﬀs, reduced by any recoveries. That is because the book
value of loans declines when charge-oﬀ are reported on loans, which could create a false sense
of inflow similar to loan sales or loan repayments.
Moreover, available-for-sale securities are subject to changes in asset valuations that
directly impact on bank equity capital. Therefore, changes in reported figures may not only
reflect changes in the flow of securities (i.e. purchases or monetization) but also changes in
fair values. In order to account for valuation eﬀects – and not misinterpret them as flow
eﬀects – we approximate flows in AFS securities by the growth rate in their amortized cost.
At the same time, we account for the impact of valuation changes on bank equity capital
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by adding in (subtracting from) equity the amount of unrealized gain (loss) on available-for-
sale securities. The growth rate in adjusted bank equity capital across banks is then used as
benchmark to the SDE optimization problem.
4.4 HQLA and data limitations
Liquid assets classified as HQLA must preserve fair values upon sale in periods of market
stress, without compromising banks’ capital position. As a measure of fair value change of
liquid securities we consider the quarterly growth rate in the ratio of fair-value to amortized
cost, where the denominator (amortized cost) controls for changes in stock. According to
this measure, equities (asset class 8) and other AFS securities (asset class 9) experienced
fair value losses several times higher than government securities (asset class 6) and agency
MBS (asset class 7) during the 2007-09 crisis, as shown in Table 3. Therefore, we exclude
equities and other AFS securities from HQLA, including only cash, Fed funds sold and repo,
government securities, and agency MBS.
[Table 3]
Moreover, the consolidation method that we apply to derive BHC data assumes that
liquid assets held at a sub-consolidated level are freely available to the consolidated entity
and not subject to regulatory, legal, tax, or other restrictions. Similarly, the cash category
includes, inter alia, central bank reserves, which we assume can be freely draw down and
not limited by central bank policies. Also, securities may have been pledged or contractually
restricted in the process of banks accessing secured funding (e.g. through repos). In line
with Basel III rules for liquidity buﬀers, we should consider only unencumbered securities
as eligible for monetization in the calculation of SDE balance sheets, i.e. excluding pledged
securities from liquid assets. Although this is possible for the total stock of securities,
Call Reports confidentiality precludes identification of unencumbered government securities,
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ABS, equities and other AFS securities. As a result, SDE weights for HQLA in the analysis
may underestimate those of unencumbered HQLA.
Finally, Basel III rules do not specify HQLA as available-for-sale, held-to-maturity, or
trading securities. But, the vast majority of securities holdings in the data are classified
as available-for-sale, which means that considering held-to-maturity or trading securities as
separate asset classes would largely reduce the sample due to missing values. Therefore,
among government securities and agency MBS, we only consider available-for-sale securities
as HQLA, while held-to-maturity and trading securities are included in the residual category
of other tangible assets.
5 Results
We estimate SDE balance sheets separately for small and large banks. This is because
liquidity contributions and appropriate levels of HQLA buﬀers may diﬀer depending on
bank size. Small banks, for example, may require higher HQLA buﬀers due to frictions and
higher costs of accessing uninsured wholesale funding (Kashyap and Stein 2000). Larger
banks, by contrast, may need lower precautionary holdings of liquid assets due to easier
access to wholesale funding markets and oﬀering a safe haven for investors in periods of
market stress (Gatev and Strahan 2006, Gatev et al. 2006). Moreover, the tiered structure
of money-market activities and payment systems implies that large banks face the extra
task of top-down liquidity provision from the central bank into the banking system, which
exposes them to diﬀerent types of liquidity risks than small banks (Acharya and Merrouche
2013, Ashcraft et al. 2011).
5.1 Reduced form profitability and capital adequacy
The profitability and capital constraints (19d) and (19e) are determined by reduced-form
models that map balance sheet allocations into profitability and capital ratios. However, the
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opportunity cost of holding liquid assets may be time-varying and aﬀected by cyclical re-
sponses of banks to aggregate shocks.16 To avoid such cyclical fluctuations aﬀecting the SDE
optimization problem, the profitability constraint is based on a fixed mapping that we derive
in two steps as follows: First, drawing on Call Report data for the period 2002:Q1-2009:Q1,
we estimate panel regressions of net interest margin and balance sheet allocations on quarter
dummies and individual bank fixed eﬀect, obtaining the prediction part of each regression
as the respective variable’s fixed component. Second, the profitability constraint is obtained
from the estimated cross-sectional regression of fixed component for net interest margin on
the fixed components of balance sheet allocations. The same approach is followed to derive
the capital adequacy constraint, based on fixed components of balance sheet allocations and
Tier-1 capital ratio.17
Estimated coeﬃcients of the reduced-form models for profitability and capital adequacy
are shown in Tables 4 and 5, respectively.18 Multiplying the coeﬃcients by the respective
mean stock growth in asset and liability classes we derive loadings for the profitability and
capital constraints. These are shown in the last two columns of Tables 4 and 5 in bold,
with profitability and capital targets shown at the bottom. Estimated loadings have almost
identical signs for both sized banks, but diﬀer in terms of statistical and economic significance
due to systematic diﬀerences in balance sheet compositions and business focus.
[Table 4]
16Gersbach and Rochet (2012) note that banks respond aggressively to aggregate shocks by reallocating
capital without internalizing the impact of their decisions on asset prices. As a result, fluctuations in asset
returns become excessively procyclical, amplifying the inherent fragility of banking institutions.
17Formulating constraints to the SDE optimization problem on the basis of fixed components of bank
metrics is consistent with regulatory practice to calibrate regulatory parameters infrequently and not in
response to cyclical fluctuations. It is also consistent with internalizing interactions of policy instruments,
avoiding unintended consequences of regulation on bank incentives to accumulate precautionary buﬀers
against adverse shocks due to the impact on bank profits (see, for example, De Nicolo et al. (2014) and
Mankart et al. (2015)).
18Diagnostic tests for multicollinearity find a high condition index for agency MBS (asset class 7) and
other deposits (liability class 6), thus dropped from both constraints.
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[Table 5]
Regarding the profitability constraint, small banks receive more negative loadings than
large banks for Fed funds and repo (liability class 1), large time deposits (liability class
5), and other deposits (liability class 7), as small banks may face higher costs of accessing
wholesale funding. Also a marginal increase in loan weights for small banks implies a higher
increase in net interest margin, thus higher loading of loans in the profitability constraint.
Finally, small banks seem to have a higher target for net interest margin than large banks,
possibly due to higher dependence of small banks’ core profitability on net interest income.
This is supported by the fact that balance sheet allocations are more informative about the
net interest margin of small banks (adjusted R2: 54%) compared to large banks (adjusted
R2: 38%).
For the capital adequacy constraint, the capital adequacy target turns out to be higher
for small banks as they tend to have higher Tier 1 capital ratios than large banks. Both
sized banks seem to receive comparable capital charges for any marginal increase in weights
of real estate loans (asset class 2) and commercial & industrial loans (asset class 3). Large
banks receive a higher capital charge on loans to individuals (asset class 4) and other loans
(asset class 5), while small banks receive a higher capital charge on other AFS securities
(asset class 9).
5.2 Liquidity shocks and HQLA shortfall
In line with Acharya and Mora (2015), we find evidence that the largest liquidity shortfall
to the U.S. commercial banking system occurred in the first half of 2007-09 crisis, driven by
weak deposit growth. Large banks seem to experience the largest shock in 2008:Q1 and small
banks a quarter earlier, in 2007:Q4. This is shown in Figure 1, illustrating actual HQLA
ratios (solid line) and estimated ones based on SDE balance sheets (dashed line), for large
and small banks. The liquidity shortfall is the diﬀerence between SDE-estimated and actual
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HQLA ratios, if positive.
[Figure 1]
In particular, the estimated liquidity shortfall for large banks peaks at $154 billion (14%
of total assets) in 2008:Q1, compared to $88 billion (8% of total assets) in 2007:Q4 and
$46 billion (4% of total assets) in 2008:Q2. For small banks, it peaks at $117 billion (11%
of total assets) in 2007:Q4. This is also confirmed by bootstrapped standard errors for
SDE-estimated HQLA ratios (shown in diamonds), which we discuss further in Section 5.4.
Figure 1 also shows estimated SDE weights by HQLA class (in bars), providing a measure
of liquidity contributions. Liquid asset classes are assigned a high (low) SDE weight if
monetization of assets from these classes tends to oﬀset a large (small) proportion of liquidity
demands from assets and liabilities. Government securities receive the highest SDE weight,
indicating the highest liquidity contribution among HQLA classes as liquidity shocks to the
system peak. In other words, as liquidity conditions in the system worsen, monetization
of government securities seem to oﬀer significant liquidity support for banks to perform
their maturity transformation role. The second highest SDE weight is assigned to cash, Fed
funds sold and repo, indicating that drawing down on cash reserves and interbank exposures
turns out to be a line of defense against liquidity shocks. This is particularly true for large
banks in the run up to full-blown liquidity shocks. Interestingly, large banks seem to abstain
from selling agency MBS to meet liquidity demands, as indicated by the virtually zero SDE
weighting for agency MBS up until 2009:Q1.
Table 6 oﬀers more detail on SDE optimization results for all balance sheet classes, con-
ditional on the largest liquidity shocks to the U.S. commercial banking system. Notice that
loans (asset classes 2-5) receive relatively high SDE weights due to loan illiquidity constraint.
Thus loan weights are not indicative of liquidity contributions, although diversification ef-
fects with other balance sheet classes are taken into account to determine SDE weights for
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liquid assets and liability classes.
[Table 6]
As already shown, government securities are assigned the highest SDE weight among
HQLA and other liquid assets. Especially for the stress quarter 2008:Q1 (2007:Q4) gov-
ernment securities are assigned a very high weight of 0.34 (0.29) for large (small) banks.
Given that asset weights sum to one, such a high weighting of government securities nearly
exhausts all available space in the balance sheet in excess of illiquid loans. This is indicative
of the intensity of full-blown liquidity shocks to the system and a crisis of banks as liquidity
providers, in line with Acharya and Mora (2015). In other words, during the largest liquidity
shocks of 2007-09 crisis, the U.S. commercial banking system seems to have exhausted its
ability to self-insure against the shocks through precautionary liquidity holdings. In that
case, oﬃcial-sector intervention to preserve banks’ liquidity-provision role in the aggregate
might have been indispensable.
This result is robust to alternative specifications of the optimization problem (19a), with
or without the profitability constraint (19d) and the capital adequacy constraint (19e). Table
7 presents estimated SDE balance sheets under alternative sets of constraints, conditionally
on the liquidity shocks during the 2007:Q4 and 2008:Q1 stress scenarios for small and large
banks, respectively. We observe that SDE weights for asset classes, and HQLA in particular,
remain almost unaltered under alternative sets of constraints.
[Table 7]
Next we investigate further the nature of liquidity shocks by discussing SDE weights and
liquidity contributions on the liability side.
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5.3 Liquidity contributions of bank deposits
SDE weights for liability classes are presented in Table 6, measuring funding-liquidity con-
tributions. A liability class receives a high (low) weight if funding inflows (outflows) in this
class tend to mitigate (exacerbate) cash outflows from other balance sheet classes. In the
run up to Lehman failure, weak growth in large time deposits (more than $100,000) appears
as a dominant source of funding vulnerability for U.S. commercial banks. This is indicated
by the zero SDE weight for large deposits, both for large and small banks. Note that large
time deposits were exceeding the FDIC deposit insurance coverage limit until early 2008:Q4
when the U.S. Congress raised it from $100,000 to $250,000. Interestingly, SDE weights
for large time deposits turned strongly positive in 2008:Q4 following the increase in deposit
insurance coverage.19
Moreover, U.S. commercial banks appear to benefit substantially from funding inflows in
the residual class of other deposits, as implied by the high SDE weighting. For example, other
deposits receive a weighting of 0.35 (0.31) for large (small) banks in 2008:Q1 (2007:Q4) when
they face the largest liquidity shock. This is possibly because they include advances from
Federal Home Loan Banks and government-sponsored borrowing directed to cover liquidity
demands from oﬀ-balance sheet exposures in the first half of the crisis, as documented in
Ashcraft, Bech, and Frame (2010).
The above findings are consistent with Acharya and Mora (2015), noting that government
support was a predominant factor allowing banks to honor their role as liquidity providers
during the crisis. Following the Lehman failure in 2008Q3, liquidity pressure to U.S. com-
mercial banks abated due to a reversal in aggregate flows from money market mutual funds
into the safe haven of bank deposits, which benefited from extended government guaran-
tees. This reversal is mainly reflected in small time deposits of large banks that receive SDE
19SDE optimization results for 2008:Q4 assign a significant weight to large time deposits of 0.27 (0.12) for
small (large) banks. These results are omitted from Table 2 due to space limitations, focusing instead on the
period 2007:Q3-2008:Q2 where we identify the largest liquidity shocks to the system, as discussed in Section
5.2. SDE optimization results for the period 2008:Q3-2009:Q1 are available from the authors upon request.
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weighting 0.32 and 0.42 for 2008:Q3 and 2008:Q4, respectively. For small banks the reversal
of funding flows into small time deposits is less evident, as the SDE weighting remains zero
both in 2008:Q2 and 2008:Q3, and increases to 0.15 in 2008:Q4.
Moreover, funding-liquidity contributions implied by SDE weights are robust to alterna-
tive specification of the optimization problem, with or without the profitability or the capital
adequacy constraint. Table 7 shows estimated SDE weights for liabilities under alternative
sets of constraints, conditionally on 2007:Q4 and 2008:Q1 stress scenarios for small and large
banks, respectively. We observe that small time deposits (liability class 4) and other deposits
(liability class 6) receive the highest SDE weight for small banks, regardless of constraints.
Other deposits also receive the highest SDE weight for large banks. But time deposits above
the deposit insurance coverage limit (liability class 5) attract zero weighting, both for small
and large banks. This is consistent with the view that oﬃcial-sector safety nets were possi-
bly indispensable at the height of the crisis, enabling U.S. commercial banks to honor their
maturity transformation role.
Next we examine whether the relative ordering of liquidity contributions is preserved
when applying bootstrapping techniques to calculate SDE weights.
5.4 Bootstrapping results
SDE weights depend on the underlying distribution of flows in assets and liabilities. To
ensure robustness of our results to alternative specifications of the underlying distribution
we rely on a bootstrapping method. This is based on the assumption that the initial sample
is representative and the empirical distribution function is a nonparametric estimate of the
population distribution. In particular, we draw random samples with replacement from the
initial data, separately for small and large banks, maintaining the same sample size as the
initial sample. For each bootstrap sample we solve the optimization problem and obtain
SDE weights for asset and liability classes. We repeat this procedure 300 times and derive
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the distribution of SDE weights each quarter.
Figure 1 shows bootstrapped standard errors (in diamonds) of SDE-estimated HQLA
ratios. They confirm the relative magnitude of liquidity shocks, with the largest shock to
large banks occurring in 2008:Q1 and to small banks in 2007:Q4. Figure 2 presents the in-
terquartile range of bootstrapped SDE weights for HQLA (outliers shown in dots), focusing
on 2007:Q4 and 2008:Q1 stress scenarios for small and large banks, respectively. The more
advanced to the right the interquartile range for a given HQLA class, the more monetization
of assets from this class tends to oﬀset liquidity demands from asset and liabilities, and vice
versa. Bootstrapping results confirm that, among HQLA holdings, government securities
provide the most important liquidity backstop to U.S. commercial banks at the height of the
liquidity crisis. They also confirm that drawing down on cash reserves and interbank expo-
sures is a line of defence against large liquidity shocks, but very limited in scope compared to
liquidating government securities holdings. It is also confirmed that monetization of agency
MBS played almost no role in releasing liquidity to banks during the largest liquidity shock
episodes.
[Figure 2]
Figure 3 illustrates the interquartile range of bootstrapped SDE weights for deposit
classes. The more advanced to the right the interquartile range for a given deposit class, the
more funding inflows in this class tend to mitigate cash outflows from other balance sheet
classes and vice versa. Bootstrapping results confirm that the dominant source of funding
vulnerability for U.S. commercial banks at the height of the liquidity crisis was large time
deposits, i.e. above the FDIC deposit insurance coverage limit. It is also confirmed that U.S.
commercial banks benefited substantially from funding inflows in the residual class of other





Systematic foreclosures of funding lines and involuntary asset growth are the basic sources
of liquidity risk in the banking system. Taking a macro-prudential standpoint we develop
a stress test methodology to gauge liquidity risk in the U.S.-chartered commercial banking
system at the height of 2007-09 crisis. We find that liquidity risk crystalized in the first
half of the crisis, challenging banks’ ability to fully fund their stock of loans from own
resources. During the largest liquidity-shock episodes we find that government securities
largely dominated all other classes of liquid assets as liquidity backstop. Also, funding
vulnerabilities mostly associated with weak growth in large time-deposits, i.e. above the
FDIC deposit insurance coverage limit.
The results oﬀer supporting evidence that government intervention was a predominant
factor that allowed the U.S. commercial banking system to honor its maturity transformation
role during the crisis. Especially for the stress scenarios of 2007:Q4 and 2008:Q1, we show
that the amount of government securities required to self-insure from the ensuing liquidity
shock would be more than 30% of system assets. This basically exhausts all available space
in bank balance sheets beyond illiquid loans, which is indicative of the intensity of liquidity
shocks in a crisis of banks as liquidity providers. In other words, at the height of the
liquidity crisis, U.S. commercial banks appear to have exhausted the ability to self-insure




Proof of Proposition 3.1: Values of (−gst+1,E) being given, we can rank them by increasing
order. Let r1, ..., rS possible diﬀerent values of (−gst+1,E), with r1 < ... < rS. Now, for any
z such that ri ≤ z ≤ ri + 1,
∑
s Ls is constant (i.e. equal to the number of s such that
−gst+1,E ≤ ri). Further, when ri ≤ z ≤ ri + 1, the maximum value of −
∑
sQs is reached for
z = ri. Hence, we can restrict z to belong to the set R.
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TABLE 1 – AVERAGE CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEET OF U.S. BANK HOLDING COMPANIES, FOR 2007:Q3-2008:Q2 
 PANEL A: SMALL BANKS PANEL B: LARGE BANKS 
  BALANCE SHEET COMPOSITION 2007:Q3 2007:Q4 2008:Q1 2008:Q2 2007:Q3 2007:Q4 2008:Q1 2008:Q2 
  Number of banks 105 106 115 120 63 65 67 61 
  Mean tangible assets (2008 $millions) 616 650 669 684 6812 6895 6373 6327 
  Median tangible assets (2008 $millions) 548 585 589 615 3303 3769 3722 3422 
  Asset classes          
  Proportion  of tangible total assets         
  1. Cash, Fed funds sold & Reverse Repo 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
  2. Loans secured by real estate  0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.51 0.53 0.54 
  3. Commercial & Industrial loans  0.09 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 
  4. Loans to individuals 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.05 
  5. Other loans  0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
  6. Government securities 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 
  7. Agency MBS 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.10 
  8. Equities 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  9. Other securities 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
10. Other tangible assets 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.07 
  Liability classes         
  Proportion  of total liabilities         
   1. Fed funds purchased & Repo 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 
   2. Demand deposits 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 
   3. Interest bearing transaction deposits 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 
   4. Time deposits less than $100,000 0.25 0.24 0.24 0.23 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 
   5. Time deposits more than $100,000 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.12 
   6. Other deposits 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.39 0.37 0.37 0.36 
   7. Other liabilities 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.11 
   Tangible equity 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 
This table shows average balance sheets of small and large U.S. commercial banks, for the period 2007:Q3-2008:Q2. Bank size is defined 
relative to the 95th percentile of the distribution of tangible total assets in each quarter. Average balance sheets are based on the sample used 




TABLE 2 – LINEAR CORRELATIONS AND BASIC MOMENTS OF THE UNSTRUCTURED COMPONENT OF GROWTH RATES IN  
ASSETS AND LIABILITIES OF LARGE U.S. BANK HOLDING COMPANIES, FOR 2008:Q1 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS Correlation with asset classes Correlation with liability classes 
OF GROWTH RATES 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Asset classes                   
1. Cash, Fed funds & Repo 1.00                  
2. Real estate loans 0.15 1.00                 
3. C&I loans  0.04 0.26 1.00                
4. Loans to individuals -0.12 0.37 0.00 1.00               
5. Other loans  0.14 0.48 0.33 0.15 1.00              
6. Government securities -0.07 0.17 0.18 0.04 0.22 1.00             
7. Agency MBS -0.10 0.19 0.11 -0.11 -0.04 -0.17 1.00            
8. Equities 0.05 0.06 -0.02 0.07 -0.08 0.14 -0.18 1.00           
9. Other securities -0.08 0.14 0.00 0.22 0.17 0.25 -0.05 0.29 1.00          
10. Other tangible assets 0.12 0.23 0.09 0.05 0.03 -0.10 0.26 -0.11 -0.06 1.00        
Liability classes                  
1. Fed funds & Repo 0.14 0.22 0.00 -0.10 0.06 -0.14 0.01 -0.03 0.13 0.11 1.00        
2. Demand deposits 0.10 -0.12 -0.17 0.03 0.06 0.00 -0.15 0.20 0.15 -0.07 -0.11 1.00       
3. Interest bearing trans.deposits -0.08 0.15 0.19 0.21 0.08 0.28 0.10 0.07 -0.01 -0.10 -0.43 0.13 1.00      
4. Time deposits ≤$100,000 -0.23 0.27 0.03 0.34 0.09 0.27 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.15 -0.15 -0.07 0.16 1.00     
5. Time deposits >$100,000 0.07 -0.10 0.01 0.16 -0.25 0.00 0.07 0.10 0.04 -0.08 -0.17 -0.03 0.04 -0.11 1.00    
6. Other deposits 0.05 0.34 0.15 0.20 0.05 0.12 0.08 0.00 -0.06 0.31 0.04 -0.36 0.05 -0.06 -0.08 1.00   
7. Other liabilities -0.06 0.16 0.08 0.03 0.18 -0.33 0.09 -0.25 -0.19 0.07 -0.01 -0.25 -0.13 0.10 -0.17 0.01 1.00 
    Mean -0.04 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.12 0.03 0.10 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 -0.04 -0.01 -0.04 0.00 0.10 
    Standard deviation 0.28 0.04 0.09 0.08 0.19 0.22 0.15 0.87 0.29 0.11 0.40 0.19 0.26 0.13 0.09 0.10 0.29 
    Skewness 0.24 3.83 -0.31 0.93 1.13 -1.49 0.29 2.68 0.35 1.74 0.56 -1.80 -0.14 3.01 -0.59 3.07 1.04 
    Kurtosis 5.26 24.93 5.62 6.22 10.47 8.45 3.58 14.66 4.84 7.21 7.48 11.04 8.10 18.37 3.70 15.89 5.18 
    Obs. 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 
This table shows linear correlations and the first four moments of unstructured growth rates in assets and liabilities for large banks in 2008:Q1. The unstructured 
components of growth rates are the same used in the optimization procedure for quarter 2008:Q1. They are obtained from growth rates in balance sheet classes by 
filtering out seasonalities, individual bank fixed effects, and autocorrelation, as we discuss in Section 4. 
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TABLE 3 – AVERAGE GROWTH RATE IN THE RATIO OF FAIR VALUE TO AMORTIZED COST OF LIQUID 
SECURITIES HOLDINGS OF U.S. BANK HOLDING COMPANIES, FOR THE PERIOD 2007:Q1-2009:Q1 
 Number of 
observations 
Government Agency MBS Equities Other AFS securities 
 Small Large Small Large Small Large Small Large Small Large 
2007:Q1 345 84 0.17% 0.15% 0.37% 0.42% 0.05% 0.26% 0.30% 0.17% 
2007:Q2 351 83 -1.05% -0.80% -1.17% -1.25% 0.03% -0.69% -0.68% -0.67% 
2007:Q3 349 78 1.14% 0.97% 1.20% 1.24% -1.33% 1.95% -0.19% -0.49% 
2007:Q4 340 75 0.71% 0.74% 1.03% 1.01% -8.41% -2.54% -0.69% -1.59% 
2008:Q1 358 80 0.84% 0.91% 1.17% 1.24% -5.06% 2.56% -2.22% -2.32% 
2008:Q2 392 76 -1.63% -1.39% -1.99% -1.80% -1.89% -0.72% -3.14% -3.07% 
2008:Q3 400 83 -0.86% -0.91% 0.86% 0.59% -7.18% -8.36% -8.69% -10.34% 
2008:Q4 370 87 1.45% 1.44% 1.61% 1.61% -18.33% -3.90% -1.53% -3.38% 
2009:Q1 378 87 0.16% 0.09% 0.70% 0.78% -0.30% -1.75% -6.68% -6.24% 
This table shows average quarterly growth rate in the ratio of fair-value to amortized cost of liquid securities holdings of small and large U.S. 
commercial banks during the 2007-09 crisis. Growth rates measure changes in fair value, where the denominator (amortized cost) controls 
for changes in stock. Since 2007:Q4 equities and other AFS securities show average fair value losses that in certain instances are several 
times higher than fair value losses in government securities and agency MBS. Therefore, equities and other AFS securities are excluded from 




TABLE 4 – CROSS SECTIONAL REGRESSIONS FOR MAPPING BALANCE SHEET 
WEIGHTS INTO PROFITABILITY OF U.S. BANK HOLDING COMPANIES, FOR THE 
PERIOD 2002:Q1-2009:Q1  
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: 
logarithm of net interest margin Coefficient 
Bootstrap          
Std. Errors 
Coefficient ×     
Mean Growth Rate 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES:  Small Large Small Large Small Large 
Loan and liquid asset classes 
fraction of tangible assets × 
growth in stock  
 
 
   
 1. Cash, Fed funds sold & Reverse Repo -0.203 -0.555** 0.293 0.265 -0.207 -0.572 
 2. Real estate loans   0.632***  0.485** 0.096 0.208  0.647  0.497 
 3. Commercial & Industrial loans   0.695***  0.533** 0.162 0.235  0.704  0.540 
 4. Loans to individuals  1.168***  1.186*** 0.226 0.317  1.148  1.176 
 5. Other loans   1.005***  0.707* 0.156 0.435  1.003  0.726 
Available for sale securities    
   
 6. Government securities  0.286***  0.021 0.110 0.243  0.286  0.021 
 7. Agency MBS - - - -  0.000  0.000 
 8. Equities  0.368 -0.875 0.579 1.461  0.355 -0.835 
 9. Other available-for-sale securities -0.614 -0.049 0.454 0.460 -0.590 -0.047 
10. Other tangible assets  0.097  0.107 0.171 0.221  0.099  0.110 
Liquid liability classes 
fraction of total liabilities × 
growth in stock 
  
 
   
 1. Fed funds purchased & Repo -1.170*** -0.592*** 0.227 0.188 -1.075 -0.530 
 2. Demand deposits  0.526***  0.088 0.178 0.240  0.482  0.082 
 3. Interest bearing transaction deposits -0.028  0.207 0.158 0.282 -0.025  0.195 
 4. Time deposits less than $100,000 -0.817*** -0.994*** 0.124 0.173 -0.757 -0.927 
 5. Time deposits more than $100,000 -0.646*** -0.183 0.144 0.254 -0.604 -0.172 
 6. Other deposits - - - -  0.000  0.000 
 7. Other liabilities -1.160*** -0.573*** 0.165 0.203 -1.076 -0.536 
Other variables       
Constant -4.856*** -4.787*** 0.100 0.187   
Profitability target (mean logarithm of net interest margin minus constant)  0.099  0.069 
Small banks R
2: 55% ;   Adjusted R2: 54%  
Wald chi2 (11): 288;  Number of banks: 277 
Large banks R
2: 42%;   Adjusted R2: 38%   
Wald chi2 (15): 97;  Number of banks: 206 
This table shows estimated coefficients of reduced-form models for net interest margin (i.e. the ratio of 
net interest income to interest earning assets), by bank size. Multiplying the coefficients by the respective 
mean growth rate in asset and liability classes we obtain loadings for the profitability constraint to the 
optimization problem. These are shown in the last two columns in bold, with profitability targets shown 
at the bottom. Bootstrap standard errors on 300 replications are reported in the thirds column. Statistical 




TABLE 5 – CROSS SECTIONAL REGRESSIONS FOR MAPPING BALANCE SHEET 
WEIGHTS INTO TIER 1 CAPITAL RATIO OF U.S. BANK HOLDING COMPANIES, FOR 
THE PERIOD 2002:Q1-2009:Q1   
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: logarithm of 
Tier 1 capital ratio  (Tier1-ratioit) Coefficient 
Bootstrap          
Std. Errors 
Coefficient ×     
Mean Growth Rate 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES:  Small Large Small Large Small Large 
Loan and liquid asset classes 
fraction of tangible assets × 
growth rate in stock  
 
 
   
 1. Cash, Fed funds sold & Reverse Repo  0.561  0.016 0.594 0.299 0.573 0.016 
 2. Real estate loans  -0.591*** -0.821*** 0.156 0.145 -0.605 -0.842 
 3. Commercial & Industrial loans  -1.053*** -1.083*** 0.228 0.242 -1.067 -1.097 
 4. Loans to individuals  0.082 -0.706** 0.424 0.328 0.080 -0.700 
 5. Other loans  -0.792*** -1.561*** 0.265 0.447 -0.791 -1.603 
Available for sale securities    
   
 6. Government securities  0.424**  0.136 0.217 0.255 0.423 0.135 
 7. Agency MBS         0.000 0.000 
 8. Equities -0.449  0.870 0.841 1.416 -0.433 0.830 
 9. Other available-for-sale securities -0.972** -0.116 0.460 0.516 -0.935 -0.110 
10. Other tangible assets  0.387  0.166 0.429 0.385 0.395 0.170 
Liquid liability classes 
fraction of total liabilities × 
growth in stock 
  
 
   
 1. Fed funds purchased & Repo -0.373 -0.082 0.340 0.214 -0.343 -0.074 
 2. Demand deposits -0.162 -0.086 0.279 0.247 -0.148 -0.080 
 3. Interest bearing transaction deposits  0.237  0.127 0.300 0.355 0.215 0.120 
 4. Time deposits less than $100,000  0.141  0.293* 0.169 0.166 0.131 0.273 
 5. Time deposits more than $100,000 -0.489** -0.277** 0.203 0.143 -0.457 -0.261 
 6. Other deposits         0.000 0.000 
 7. Other liabilities  0.069  0.091 0.204 0.220 0.064 0.085 
Other variables       
Constant -1.733*** -1.688*** 0.159 0.149   
Tier1 capital target (mean logarithm of Tier 1 ratio minus constant) -0.385 -0.561 
Small banks R
2: 35%   Adjusted R2: 31% 
Wald chi2 (15): 124;  Number of banks: 277  
Large banks R
2: 39%;   Adjusted R2: 34%   
Wald chi2 (15): 105;  Number of banks: 206  
This table shows estimated coefficients of reduced-form models for Tier-1 capital ratio, by bank size. 
Multiplying the coefficients by the respective mean growth rate in asset and liability classes we obtain 
loadings for the capital adequacy constraint to the optimization problem. These are shown in the last two 
columns in bold, with capital adequacy targets shown at the bottom. Bootstrap standard errors on 300 
replications are reported in the thirds column. Statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level is denoted 





TABLE 6 – SDE BALANCE SHEETS OF U.S. BANK HOLDING COMPANIES,  FOR THE STRESS PERIOD 2007:Q3-2008:Q2 
 PANEL A: SMALL BANKS PANEL B: LARGE BANKS 
 SDE BALANCE SHEETS  2007:Q3 2007:Q4 2008:Q1 2008:Q2 2007:Q3 2007:Q4 2008:Q1 2008:Q2 
 Number of banks  105 106 115 120 63 65 67 61 
 Mean tangible assets (2008 $millions) 616 650 669 684 6812 6895 6373 6327 
 Median tangible assets (2008 $millions) 548 585 589 615 3303 3769 3722 3422 
 Asset classes          
 Proportion  of tangible total assets         
  1. Cash, Fed funds sold & Reverse Repo 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.13 
  2. Loans secured by real estate  0.48 0.48 0.52 0.48 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 
  3. Commercial & Industrial loans  0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 
  4. Loans to individuals 0.05 0.04 0.19 0.28 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.06 
  5. Other loans  0.04 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
  6. Government securities 0.15 0.29 0.14 0.09 0.11 0.28 0.34 0.08 
  7. Agency MBS 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 
  8. Equities 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.11 
  9. Other securities 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
10. Other tangible assets 0.13 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 Liability classes         
 Proportion  of total liabilities         
  1. Fed funds purchased & Repo 0.20 0.19 0.15 0.13 0.16 0.00 0.08 0.00 
  2. Demand deposits 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.17 0.18 0.56 
  3. Interest bearing transaction deposits 0.00 0.19 0.06 0.32 0.00 0.14 0.05 0.27 
  4. Time deposits less than $100,000 0.00 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.12 0.07 0.12 
  5. Time deposits more than $100,000 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 
  6. Other deposits 0.74 0.31 0.37 0.00 0.64 0.17 0.35 0.00 
  7. Other liabilities 0.06 0.02 0.42 0.48 0.11 0.40 0.27 0.02 
This table shows SDE optimization results conditionally on the largest liquidity shocks to the U.S. commercial banking system, for large and small banks. 
SDE weights provide a measure of liquidity contributions of balance sheet classes. Liquid asset classes are assigned a high (low) SDE weight if 
monetization of assets from these classes tends to offset a large (small) proportion of liquidity demands from assets and liabilities. Liability classes receive 




TABLE 7 – SDE BALANCE SHEETS OF U.S. BANK HOLDING COMPANIES UNDER ALTERNATIVE OPTIMIZATION 
CONSTRAINTS, CONDITIONALLY ON 2007:Q4 AND 2008:Q1 STRESS SCENARIOS 
 
PANEL A: SMALL BANKS 
CONDITIONALLY ON 2007:Q4 
PANEL B: LARGE BANKS  
CONDITIONALLY ON 2008:Q1 















 Asset classes          
 Proportion  of tangible total assets         
  1. Cash, Fed funds sold & Reverse Repo 0.06 0.09 0.06 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 
  2. Loans secured by real estate  0.48 0.48 0.49 0.48 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 
  3. Commercial & Industrial loans  0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 
  4. Loans to individuals 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 
  5. Other loans  0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
  6. Government securities 0.28 0.25 0.26 0.29 0.34 0.33 0.31 0.34 
  7. Agency MBS 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  8. Equities 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  9. Other securities 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
10. Other tangible assets 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
HQLA ratio   0.34 0.34 0.33 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 
 Liability classes         
 Proportion  of total liabilities         
  1. Fed funds purchased & Repo 0.21 0.21 0.20 0.19 0.08 0.07 0.13 0.08 
  2. Demand deposits 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.19 0.04 0.18 
  3. Interest bearing transaction deposits 0.03 0.00 0.11 0.19 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.05 
  4. Time deposits less than $100,000 0.34 0.20 0.14 0.29 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.07 
  5. Time deposits more than $100,000 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  6. Other deposits 0.28 0.38 0.43 0.31 0.39 0.34 0.50 0.35 
  7. Other liabilities 0.14 0.21 0.13 0.02 0.28 0.29 0.29 0.27 
This table shows SDE balance sheets and HQLA ratios for U.S. commercial banks under alternative sets of constraints to the optimization problem and 
conditionally on 2007:Q4 and 2008:Q1 liquidity stress scenario for small and large, respectively. SDE weights provide a measure of liquidity 
contributions of balance sheet classes. Liquid asset classes are assigned a high (low) SDE weight if monetization of assets from these classes tends to 
offset a large (small) proportion of liquidity demands from assets and liabilities. Liability classes receive a high (low) SDE weight if funding inflows 
(outflows) in these classes tend to mitigate (exacerbate) cash outflows from other balance sheet classes.   
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FIGURE 1: SDE AND ACTUAL HQLA RATIOS OF U.S. BANK HOLDING COMPANIES, 
FOR THE PERIOD 2007:Q1-2009:Q1 
 
This figure shows average HQLA holdings (solid line) and estimated HQLA based on SDE balance 
sheets (dashed line) for large banks (Panel A) and small banks (Panel B), for the period 2007:Q1-
2009:Q1. All quantities are expressed as a proportion of total assets. The aggregate liquidity shortfall 
corresponds to any shortfall of actual HQLA holdings relative to the SDE estimated. The decomposition 
of estimated SDE weights per HQLA class (cash, Fed funds sold and repo, government securities, and 
agency MBS) is shown each quarter in bars. Bank size (small, large) is defined relative to the 95th 
percentile of the distribution of total assets each quarter. Bootsrapped standard errors for actual (dotted 
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FIGURE 2: BOOTSTRAPPED SDE WEIGHTS FOR HQLA, BY BANK SIZE 
 
This figure shows the interquartile range of bootstrapped SDE weights for HQLA (outliers shown in dots), for large banks (Panel A) and 
small banks (Panel B) for the stress scenarios 2008:Q1 and 2007:Q4, respectively. The more advanced to the right the interquartile range 
for a given HQLA class, the more monetization of assets from this class tends to offset liquidity demands from asset and liabilities, and 
vice versa. The bootstrapping method draws random samples with replacement from the initial data, separately for small and large banks, 
maintaining the same sample size as the initial sample. For each bootstrap sample we solve the optimization problem and obtain SDE 




FIGURE 3: BOOTSTRAPPED SDE WEIGHTS FOR DEPOSIT CLASSES, BY BANK SIZE 
 
This figure shows the interquartile range of bootstrapped SDE weights for deposit classes, for large banks (Panel A) and small banks 
(Panel B) for the stress scenarios 2008:Q1 and 2007:Q4, respectively. The more advanced to the right the interquartile range for a given 
deposit class, the more funding inflows in this class tend to mitigate cash outflows from other balance sheet classes and vice versa. The 
bootstrapping method draws random samples with replacement from the initial data, separately for small and large banks, maintaining 
the same sample size as the initial sample. For each bootstrap sample we solve the optimization problem and obtain SDE weights for 
asset and liability classes. We repeat this procedure 300 times and derive the distribution of SDE weights each quarter.   
 
